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Abstract-A (plaintext) message is said to be unconcealable if the encrypted message is the same 
as the original plaintext message. An analysis of the Williams public-key encryption scheme from 
the point of view of (un) concealability of messages is presented. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a thought provoking paper Difiie and Hellman in 1976[8] laid the foundations of the 
modern public-key cryptosystems by enunciating the basic principles of their design. Almost 
immediately Rivest et al. [5] announced the first and a very elegant example of such a system. 
This latter example now popularly known as the RSA public-key cryptosystem is one of the 
most thoroughly analyzed cryptosystems of modern times[9-131. The basic idea behind the 
RSA public key cryptosystem may be described as follows. Let p and q be two large primes 
(of the order of 10”“‘) and let n = pq. Choose an (odd) integer e such that e is relatively prime 
to (p - l)(q - 1). Find the integer d as the solution of the linear congruence ed E 1 
(mdd(p - l)(q - 1)). Let dRsA = (Ml0 < M < n - I} be the set of all possible plaintext 
messages. The encryption function ERsA : .ARSA+ARSA is a bijection where 
C = ERsA(M) = M’(mod n). (1) 
The decryption function DRsA : .MRsA +AfRSA is again a bijection where 
DRSA(C) = P(mod n). (2) 
It can be shown that DRSA(ERSA(M)) = A4 [5]. The user wishing to receive secret information 
makes the pair (n, e) public but keeps p, q, d and (p - l)(q - 1) all secret. Since (n, e) is 
public, any one can send a message in secret to the user. But asp, q, d and (p - l)(q - 1) 
are not known to anybody except the user, no one other than the user can decrypt the 
message. Because of this ERsA is called a trap door one way function. While the problem of 
decrypting the encrypted message in the RSA scheme without the knowledge of the 
decrypting exponent d is known to be related to the prime factorization of the modulus n, 
the equivalence of these two problems is yet unsettled. For a thorough discussion of the 
various possible cryptanalytic attacks and ways to safeguard from these attacks refer the 
series of papers [9-l 31. 
Williams in 1980[3] presented a modified version of the RSA public key cryptosystem. 
This modification relates to the preprocessing of the message before being transformed by 
a trap door one way function of the kind given in (1). 
Let n = pq where p and q are two (large) primes of the form p E 3(mod 8) and 
q E 7(mod 8). Define i.(n) = Icmlp - 1, q - l] where lcm is the least common multiple. For 
the above choice of p and q, clearly i.(n) is an even integer. Select an (odd) integer e to be 
relatively prime to E,(n). Let 
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For the above choice of p and q notice that m is always an integer. Find d as the (unique) 
solution of the linear congruence 
ed = m(mod i(n)) 
The message space .Mw for the Williams public-key encryption scheme is defined to be 
~ _ 
w- 
i I 
M either 2(2M + 1) < n if J[2M + 1, n] = - 1 
or 4(2M + 1) < n if J[2M + 1, n] = + 1 I 
where the Jacobian symbol J[a, b] is defined in section 2, the encryption function E, defined 
as a composite function is E&M) = E,(E,(M)) where 
N = E,(M) = 
2(2M + 1) if J[2M + 1, n] = - 1 
4(2M + 1) ifJ[2M + 1, n] = + 1 (3) 
and 
C = E,(N) z N”(mod n). 
The decryption function, likewise, is defined as a composite 
where 
L = D*(C) s Cd(mod n) 
and 
if L z O(mod 4) 
ir+- 1] ifL s l(mod4) 
a(L)= ‘ * L 
- [ -- 
2 2 
1  if L z 2(mod 4) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(p+- l] if L = 3(mod 4). 
It can be shown[3] that if ME.M~ then 
4(~2(~2VW4)N) = ~4. (7) 
These are, however, a number of differences between the above two schemes. In the RSA 
scheme, the encrypting exponent e in (1) is an odd integer but in the Williams scheme the 
encrypting exponent as given in (4) is 2e which is always even. This latter fact that the 
encrypting exponent is even along with the preprocessing of the message as indicated in (3) 
are primarily responsible for the very unique property of Williams public key cryptosystem 
namely that it is the only known public key cryptosystem in which cryptoanalysis without 
the knowledge of the proper keys is shown to be equivalent o the notorious computationally 
infeasible problem of prime factorization[3]. For an independent yet a closely related 
development refer Rabin [4]. For a comprehensive discussion of various public key crypto- 
systems refer the surveys by Hellman[l4], Lakshmivarahan[7] and the books b? 
Konheim [ 161 and Denning [ 151. 
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The nine unavoidably unconcealable 
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Let E and D refer to the encryption and decryption functions of a cryptosystem. A 
message A4 is said to be unconcealabie by the cryptosystem if C = E(M) = hi. In other 
words, unconcealable messages correspond to the fixed points of the encrypting function. 
A cryptosystem is said to possess the property of total concealability if for no message M, 
we have E(M) = M. Recently, Blakely and Borosh[l] initiated the study of 
(un)concealability of the RSA public key cryptosystems. Among other things they showed 
that (a) in every RSA cryptosystem there are at least 9 (nine) unavoidably unconcealable 
messages and (b) that there are RSA public key cryptosystems in which no message is 
concealable. In other words, RSA public key cryptosystem does not possess the property 
of total concealability. Blakeley and Borosh[l] also derived conditions under which the 
number of unconcealable messages can be kept to a minimum of those unavoidably 
unconcealable messages. The nature and properties of these nine messages are described 
in Fig. 1. 
In Section 2 of this paper we collectively present the mathematical preliminaries that 
are needed in our development. We then derive conditions for the Williams scheme to 
possess the property of total concealability in Section 3. An alternate approach to the study 
of (un)concealable messages is presented in Section 4. This latter approach sheds further 
light on the similarities and differences between the RSA and the Williams public key 
cryptosystems. 
2. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES 
For the sake of completeness and easy reference we collect most of the mathematical 
results relevant for our development. We begin by discussing the properties of quadratic 
residues. An integer x which is relatively prime to a prime modulus y is said to be a quadratic 
(non) residue of y if there does (not) exist an integer z such that 
z2 E x(mod y). 
In other words, x is said to be a quadratic (non) residue if it is (not) a perfect square mod 
y. As an example, if y = 7 then 1, 2, 4 are quadratic residues and 3, 5, 6 are quadratic non 
residues. This property of an integer x with respect o a prime modulus y is often denoted 
by the Legendre symbol L[x, y] which takes the value + 1 or - 1 depending on x is a 
quadratic residue or non residue respectively[6]. It can be shown [6] that L[x, y] = + 1 if and 
only if 
x(@-~)‘~) E k l(mod y). 
L[s. y] = 0 if x is a multiple of y. 
A closely related concept is that of the Jacobian Symbol. Let x and y be two integers with 
_t‘ being odd. The Jacobian Symbol J[x, y] has the following properties: 
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1 if xtcV- ‘Us) s + l(mod y) 
J[x, Yl = _ 1 if_x(C”-‘)P) - - l(mody) 
I 0 if x is a multiple of y. 
That is, J[x, y] = L[x, y] if y is a prime. 
(52) 4x3 YIY21 = Ax, YJJLG Y21 
(53) 44x2, rl = Jh YlJk2, Yl 
(54) If xi = x,(mod y), then J[x,, y] = J[x,, y] 
(J3 42 , y] = (- l)(-+-)/* 
(56) J[- 1 y]=(- l)cv-1)/2 9 
(57) J[x, y&Q, x] = (- l)[‘” - ‘KY - ‘)I/4 
(57) is usually known as the quadratic reciprocity law. An immediate consequence of (57) 
is that if x and y are distinct odd primes of the form 
x - y = 3(mod 4) then, J[x, y] = - Jb, x]. 
LEMMA 1 
Let y, and yz be two relatively prime integers. The system of simultaneous linear 
congruences 
x = b,(mod y,) 
x = b,(mod y2) 
has a unique solution (x) modulo y = y,y, given by 
x = &YLYZ + b&)(mod Y) 
where yGz z l(mod y,) and yj, z l(mod y2). 
The above lemma is the well known Chinese remainder theorem[6]. The following 
lemma 2 constitutes a standard application of the Chinese remainder theorem[6]. 
LEMMA 2 
If y = y,y, where y, and y, are odd primes,f(x) is a polynomial with integer coefficients 
then 
f(x) s O(mod y) (8) 
has solution if and only if each of the following congruences 
f(x) 3 O(mod yi) i=1,2 (9) 
has a solution. Further if N and N, are the number of solutions of (8) and (9), then 
N = N,N2. 
LEMMA 3 
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Let a, b, c, y be integers with y being an odd prime and let a be relatively prime to 
y. The quadratic congruence 
ax’+bx+c =O(mody) 
has an integer solution if and only if (b2 - 4~) is a perfect square mod y, that is there 
exists an integer z such that 
z* E (b’ - 4ac)(mod y). 
The proof of this rather elementary lemma is left as an exercise. 
LEMMA 4 
If a and b are integers with a > 0 and a and b relatively prime, then there are infinitely 
many primes in the arithmetic progression nu + b where n = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . 
Lemma 4 is known as the Dirichlet’s theorem[6]. 
LEMMA 5 
Let x be an integer relatively prime to a prime modulus y. If N is the number of 
solutions to the following congruence 
xk s l(mod y). 
Then N = GCD(k, y - 1) where GCD is the greatest common divisor. 
Proc$ In this case the multiplicative group mod y is a cyclic group of order 0, - 1). If 
g is a generator of this group then there exists an integer r such that 1 I t < y - 1 and 
x = g’(mod y) 
Now 
Xk = g’k E l(mod0) - 1)) 
Since g is a generator, we have 
tk 3 O(mod y). 
This latter congruence has N = GCD(k, y - 1) solutions. 
3. CONDITIONS FOR TOTAL CONCEALABILITY 
Let us first consider the Williams encryption scheme when the encryption exponent e is 
chosen to be unity. For this choice of e, our main result is the contents of the following: 
THEOREM 1 
A set of conditions that will guarantee the total concealability property for the Williams 
public key encryption scheme are that the primesp and q (used in Section 3) also satisfy (Cl) 
and (C2) where 
w Eitherp s u,(mod 31)or q f u,(mod 31) or both 
(C2) Eirher p = b,(mod 127) or q E b,(mod 127) or both 
and 
J[u,. 311 = J[b,, 1271 = - 1 for i = 1, 2. 
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Proof. Let ME&~ Then 
= i 
4(2M+l)2(modn)ifJ[2M+l,n]=- 1 
I 16(2M+l)2(modn)ifJ[2M+l,n]=+l ’ 
Case 1. J[2M+ l,n]= - 1. 
In this case M is unconcealable if 
4(2M + 1)2 = M(mod n) 
that is, if 
(16 MZ + 15M + 4) E O(mod n). (10) 
From Section 3, since n E S(mod 8) and as 16 is relatively prime to n, by lemma 3, M is 
unconcealable if lj2 - 4 x 16 x 4 = - 31 is a perfect square mod n. That is, if there exists 
an integer x such that 
x2+31 rO(modn). (11) 
By lemma 2, congruence (11) has a solution if and only if each of the following congruences 
x2+31 =O(modp) 
x2 + 31 E O(mod q) (12) 
has a solution. Thus, M is concealable if at least one of the above two congruences in (12) 
does not have a solution. And the latter is true if 
eitherJ[- 3l,p]= - 1 orJ[- 3l,qJ= - 1 orboth. 
From the properties (53) and (56) it follows that (13) is equivalent to 
either J[3 1, p] = 1 or J[3 1, q] = 1 or both 
By quadratic reciprocity law (57) we easily see that (14) is again equivalent to 
either J[p, 3 1] = - 1 or J[q, 3 1] = - 1 or both 
Now using (54) from (15) we obtain that A4 is concealable if either 
p = a,(mod 31) or q z a,(mod 31) or both 
where J[a, 311 = - 1 for i = 1,2. 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
Case 2. J[2M + 1, n] = + 1. Since the main line of arguments is the same as in Case 1, we 
merely indicate the major steps. Thus A4 is unconcealable if
64M2 + 63M + 16 = O(mod n). (17) 
That is, if 632 - 4 x 64 x 16 = - 127 is a perfect square mod n. The latter is true if the 
following congruences 
x2 + 127 = O(modp) 
x2+ 127zO(modq) (18) 
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have a solution. Thus M is concealable if at least one of the two congruences in (18) does 
not admit a solution, that is if 
eitherJ[- 127,p]= - 1 orJ[- 127,q]= - 1 orboth (19) 
clearly (19) is equivalent to 
either p = b,(mod 127) or q z b,(mod 127) or both (20) 
where J[b, 1271 = - 1, i = 1,2. 
The proof of the theorem is complete if we observe that an arbitrary message MC.&, is 
either of the type Case 1 or Case 2. 
Remark 1. One of the important consequences of our theorem is that there are a variety 
of ways for selecting the primes p and q that will guarantee total concealability. As an 
example one could choose 
p = a,(mod 31) q = b,(mod 127) 
p = 3(mod 8) q = 7(mod 8) 
where J[a,, 311 = J[b2, 1271 = - 1. 
Solving these systems using lemma 1, we obtain 
p =_ (155 + 32a,)(mod 248) 
q E (127 + 128b,)(mod 1016). 
Now choosing a, = 11, b, = 7 we see that 
p = 1 l(mod 248) q = 7(mod 1016). 
By Dirichelet’s Theorem (lemma 4), there are infinitely many primes p and q of the above 
form. 
Remark 2. Each of the congruences in (12) admits at most two solutions and by lemma 
2 congruence (11) has at most four solutions. Thus, in Case 1, there are at most four 
unconcealable messages. Similarly, there are at most four unconcealable messages in Case 
2. Stated in other words, if e = 1, then the total number of unconcealable messages in the 
Williams public-key encryption scheme is never more than eight and this bound is uniform 
in n. This is in sharp contrast with the RSA public key scheme where there are at least 
nine unconcealable messages. 
Remark 3. If we choose the encrypting exponent e in the Williams’ scheme to be greater 
than unity, then, M is unconcealable if 
4’(2M + 1)2e E M(mod n) in Case 1 
16’(2M + l)2e = M(mod n) in Case 2. 
In each of these cases by lemma 2 there are at most 4e2 messages that are 
unconcealable. That is if e > 1, there are at most 8e2 unconcealable messages in the 
Williams’ scheme. Thus e = 1 minimizes the upper bound on the number of unconcealable 
messages. 
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4. CONCEALABILITY OF THE SECOND KIND: 
Blakely and Borosh[l] have shown that if any member of the subset of nontrivial, 
unavoidably unconcealable messages is known (refer to Fig. I), then the RSA scheme can 
be compromised. The total concealability property of the Williams scheme may suggest hat 
it is devoid of these problems since there is no unavoidably unconcealable message. But a 
careful scrutiny of our analysis in section 3 reveals that it is the preprocessing (through the 
linear transformation) of the message that is primarily responsible for the total con- 
cealability. In fact through a similar preprocessing one can obtain instances of the classical 
RSA scheme with total concealability properties. As an example, consider the RSA scheme 
with p = 3, q = 7, 4(n) = 12, n(n) = 6, e = 5 and d = 5. Let C = E(M) = &(E,(M)) and 
M = D(C) = D@,(C)) where E,(x) = (x + 1) (mod n) D2(x) = (x - 1) (mod n); 
E,(x) = x’(mod n) and D,(x) = xd(mod n). 
From Table 1 we see that there is total concealability. But it has been well known in 
cryptography that linear transformations do not intrinsically add to the security. Thus in 
order to better understand the role of the linear transformation and its consequent effect on 
security through unconcealability, we propose a concealability condition of the second kind 
as follows: A message M is unconcealable if 
Y = E,(Y) =YZe(modn) (21) 
and Y = E,(M), where E, and E2 are given in (3) and (4). If there is no M satisfying these 
conditions, then the system is said to possess total concealability of the second kind. Since 
Y = E,(M) is relatively prime to n, the above condition can be rewritten as 
Y ‘+’ = l(mod n). (22) 
Clearly, if y is a solution to (22) then M = E - ‘(y ) is an unconcealable message of the second 
kind if and only if MtMw In other words, the number of solutions to (22) is clearly an upper 
bound on one number unconcealable messages of the second kind. Before we actually 
compute this bound, an example will help to illustrate these ideas. 
M 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
a 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Table I. 
- 
X = El (M) 
1 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
f 
___- 
E2(X) 
1 
11 
12 
16 
17 
6 
7 
8 
18 
19 
2 
3 
13 
14 
15 
4 
5 
9 
10 
20 
0 
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Example. Let p = 19 and q = 7. Then, n = 133, m = 14, and n(n) = 18. If e = 5, then 
d = 10. It can be seen that 
Let S, = {yly = E,(M) and Mt&,}. 
We have then 
Define 
S, = (10, 12,30, 34,36,44,52,58,74,90,92,94, 100, 
102,106, 108,110,122, 124, 130,132) 
S2 = {y]~~-’ 3 l(mod n) and y relatively prime to n}. 
By direct computation we obtain 
Sz = { 1,4,9, 11, 16,23,25, 30,36,39,43,44,58,64,74,81,85, 
92,93,99, 100, 102, 106, 120, 121. 123, 1301. 
clearly 
S = S1 n Sz = {30,44,58,74,92,100,102, 106, 130) 
If s-i = {M]M = E,-‘(y) and YES}, then 
S-’ = (4,5,7, 11, 12, 18,25,26,32}. 
Thus there are nine unconcealable messages. Of these, M = 7 is a multiple of q = 7. This 
example clearly illustrates the importance of the concept of concealability of the second 
kind. 
We now proceed to compute the numbers of solutions to the congruence (22). From 
lemmas 5 and 1 we easily see that there are N = fi GCD(2e - 1, pi - 1) solutions of (22) 
I=1 
where p, = p and p2 = q. The question now is for what choices of p and q would N be a 
minimum? To this end first recall[2] that a prime y is called a safe prime (defined in the 
context of the RSA scheme) if y = 2~’ + 1 where 4” is also a prime. Since p, = p z 3(mod 
8) and pz = q - 7(mod 8), one can rewrite p, = 1 + 2 (4x, + 1) and p2 = 1 + 2(4x, + 3) for 
some non-negative integers x,, x2. Further by Dirichlet’s Theorem (lemma 4.) there are 
infinitely many primes of the form (4x + 1) and (4x2 + 3). Hence by proper choice of x, 
and x2 one can force the primes in the Williams scheme to be safe primes, namely, 
p*=2p;+1 and p*=2p;+ 1 where Pi and pi are primes. Hence 
N = ,fl, GCD(2e - 1,2p3. Now if we choose p; to be large and (2e - 1) (_min(p:} we 
I 
readily see that N = 1. In other words, for this choice of primes, y = 1 is the only solution 
to (22). However, since E,(M) > 2 for all M. it readily follows that there is total 
concealability of the second kind. 
In the preceding analysis we have in fact proved the following: 
THEOREM 2 
A set of conditions for the Williams public key cryptosystem to possess the property 
of total concealability of the second kind are (a) p, = 2 p; + 1 = p and pz = 2~; + 1 = q 
where pi and pi are primes of the form p; 5 l(mod 4) and pi z 3(mod 4) and (b) 
(2e - 1) < min{p;,pi}. 
Remark 4. If we choose e = 1 in particular, then N = 1 for all primes p, = p and pz = q. 
Thus we obtain total concealability of the second kind in this case. 
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Remark 5. A cryptanalyst can still start with the congruence 
E&)=y”ry(modn). (23) 
Notice that there are at least four solutions to (23) namely, 0 and 1, the two trivial 
solutions, one solution is a multiple of p and the other is a multiple of q. In fact most of 
the analysis of Part II of the paper by Blakley and Blakley[2] can be applied to (23). 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We have analyzed the Williams public key cryptosystem from the point of view of 
concealability of messages. There are two natural ways in which one can approach this 
concealability concept. The importance of the unconcealability of the second kind arises 
primarily from the fact that for these unconcealable messages Williams encryption 
algorithms essentially reduces to a linear transformation. For each of these two modes of 
definition of concealability, we have derived sufficient conditions for total concealability. 
It is interesting to note that safe primes for RSA scheme also turn out to be safe primes 
for Williams scheme for the concealability of the second kind. 
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